WHAT CAN ONE REASONABLY SAY ABOUT NONEXISTENCE? A TIBETAN WORK ON THE PROBLEM OF A SRAY ASIDDHA
The fallacy of a sray asiddhahetu, or a "logical reason whose basis is unestablished" arises when the subject of an argument is nonexistent; in usual cases, this subject failure implies that the proposition to be proved (s adhya) cannot be established -Buddhists such as Dharmak ırti repeatedly stress that when the subject fails, a debate about its properties ceases. To take an invented example, if one says that "Pegasus flies around the Aegean", it suffices to show that there is no Pegasus and one will have, ipso facto, short-circuited the question of "his" flight, or even proved the contrary, i.e. that he does not fly. Similarly, if someone shows that the Primordial Matter (pradh ana) accepted in S am . khya philosophy does not actually exist, then the S am . khya's own thesis that pradh ana has such and such properties will thereby be refuted. 1 The problem however becomes thorny when one is proving simple nonexistence of some pseudo-entity, for then the case should be different from that of Pegasus's supposed flight. The height of absurdity would be if all proofs of nonexistence became self-refuting because the subject failed to exist.
The problem of a sray asiddha is taken up in various Buddhist contexts -typically in connection with proofs of momentariness (ks . an . abha _ ngasiddhi) 2 and in connection with later Madhyamaka proofs of the absence of intrinsic nature (nih . svabh avat a). Although it is certainly not our intention to inventory all the considerable Indian and Tibetan Buddhist literature on this problem of a sray asiddha, or even the majority of texts in which the problem figures, certain seminal works do stand out and are repeatedly cited. Besides passages from Dign aga, we should mention the substantial and influential sections in Dharmak ırti's Pram an . av arttika IV, k. 136-148 and Pram an . avini scaya III, as well as those in the works of Kamala s ıla, in particular his Madhyamak aloka. The Tibetan treatment is largely centered around Tsong kha pa's dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris, his commentary on the Madhyamak alam . k ara in which he integrates and elaborates upon the key passages in Dign aga, Dharmak ırti and Kamala s ıla. Although there are some relatively brief Journal of Indian Philosophy 26: 99-129, 1998. c passages in the Sa skya pa Rigs gter and Pram an . av arttika commentaries (e.g. gSer mdog Pan . chen S akya mchog ldan sketches out some significant differences from the treatment in dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris 3 ), it does seem that the problem of a sray asiddha was not treated nearly as thoroughly in the other schools as in the dGe lugs, where it became a recurring topos figuring markedly in numerous works. The present article consists primarily in a translation of the section on a sray asiddha in a text by A lag sha Ngag dbang bstan dar (1759-1840), a dGe lugs pa scholar who was from the A la shan region of Inner Mongolia but wrote in Tibetan and who was, in our opinion, remarkable for his clear and often quite innovative thinking. His gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag is a Madhyamaka work, one that treats of various problems centered around the Sv atantrika Madhyamaka's use of the ek anekaviyogahetu (= gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs "neither one nor many reason [for s unyat a]"). For Ngag dbang bstan dar the problem of a sray asiddha arises when the Madhyamaka uses logical reasons like the ek anekaviyogahetu to prove ultimate voidness of things; it also occurs when he uses logical reasoning to prove that pseudo-entities do not exist at all. Ngag dbang bstan dar, thus, like his Indian and Tibetan Sv atantrika predecessors, zig-zags between the Madhyamaka and logicians' positions, using the latter to buttress the former.
A striking aspect of the later Indian and Tibetan explanations of a sray asiddha is that certain earlier texts are almost invariably cited in later ones, giving a kind of "unfolding telescope" effect where each subsequent text includes its predecessors but seems to enlarge upon them and carry the ideas a few steps further, all the while seeking to remain faithful to the original intentions of Dign aga. This impression is, however, potentially misleading. In fact, be it the position of Kamala s ıla, that of Tsong kha pa or Ngag dbang bstan dar, what is at stake is a complex synthesis of disparate doctrine that has been elaborated over time; it would thus be a mistake if the seeming elegance of the unfolding telescope presentations lulled us into thinking that the later presentation was also ahistorically present ab initio. Lopez, in his Study of Sv atantrika, has described the Tibetan theory on a sray asiddha as it is found in Tsong kha pa, rGyal tshab and lCang skya rol pa'i rdo rje and others: this constitutes the received position for Ngag dbang bstan dar. The section in dBu ma rgyan gyis zin bris treating of a sray asiddha has been translated in Tillemans (1984) . As we shall try to show in the rather extensive explanatory notes to our translation, the positions that we find in Tsong kha pa, Ngag dbang bstan dar and others had an intricate history that certainly did not just consist in bringing out what Dign aga and Dharmak ırti and Kamala s ıla had already understood.
Various works of bsTan dar have been studied by now, and it is becoming clear that this later dGe lugs pa thinker did make significant contributions, especially in the domain of ideas and arguments where he often shows originality in building upon and reinterpreting earlier writers. 4 The gCig du bral gyi rnam bzhag, and in particular the section on a sray asiddha, is a good case in point. On certain topics, such as avoidance of a sray asiddha in cases of simple, non-implicative, negation (prasajyapratis . edha), bsTan dar makes a radical break with his Indian and Tibetan predecessors, and arguably he is right to do so. The rapprochement with the Madhyamaka debate on "concordantly appearing subjects" (chos can mthun snang ba) is also noteworthy for its philosophical interest, turning as it does on the general problem of the incommensurability of rival theories.
Readers will probably recognize that the problem of talking about non-being has a long history, not only in the East, but in the West, including its twentieth century technical treatment in formal logic's theory of descriptions and in the theory of presuppositions. We add this later Tibetan position on what is one of the most recurrent and interesting problems of philosophy. TRANSLATION x1. Secondly, the doubt that the subject (chos can; dharmin) might be unestablished, when one presents the formal argument (sbyor ngag; prayogav akya).
[Objection:] If we follow what is literally stated in the Madhyamak alam . k ara, it is evident that one also presents partless consciousness, Primordial Matter (spyi gtso bo; pradh ana) and so forth 5 as subjects of enquiry (shes 'dod chos can) for a valid logical reason. 6 Thus this [reason] would have an unestablished basis (gzhi ma grub pa; a sray asiddha). Would it not then result that the reason would be one which is unestablished (ma grub pa; asiddha) because the entity of the subject does not exist? 7 x2. By way of a reply to this [objection] , many scholars have said that there is no [such] fault so long as one presents simple negations (med dgag; prasajyapratis . edha) as both the reason and the property to be proved (bsgrub bya'i chos; s adhyadharma), but that should one present a positive phenomenon (sgrub pa; vidhi) [This is called a "nominal subject"] because, at that time, one is not proving that being a permanent substance is located in a real entity, space, and thus this type of space is just merely presented as the subject, but is not the locus or subject. 14 Now, something's being a "nominal subject" means that although it might be stated as the subject, it is not the locus of the property to be proved (s adhyadharma), and is thus an unrelated subject. Consequently, although the nominal subject, i. ] This is not the same, because of the following: if something is a valid reason it must be established on the basis of the subject of enquiry in accordance with its mode of presentation ('god tshul), 18 and so, because the appearance to conceptual thought as something excluded from not-sound is an imagined entity (kun brtags; parikalpita), it does not concord at all with being a product. 19 This follows, for it was stated in [Tsong kha pa's] dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris:
If one is proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced, then as the exclusion qua appearance (snang ldog), which appears to conceptual thought as excluded from not sound, is not a real entity (dngos po), the reason, i.e. being produced, does not qualify it. Rather, [being produced] must qualify the basis of the appearance (snang gzhi), i.e. sound. This is due to the essential feature that real entities (dngos po) are taken as the reason and property to be proved.
The [latter] necessary implication (khyab pa; vy apti) holds, because (a) it is obvious that a conceptual appearance will not be established as the subject of enquiry of an argument where real entities are presented as the reason and property to be proved, and (b) , but what appears to conceptual thought as sound cannot be the basis that is ascertained as produced.
x7. To summarize, although we present space as the subject to the Vai ses . ika, it is not the subject, but the appearance of this [space] is the subject. And when we prove that sound is impermanent by means of the reason, being produced, what appears as sound to conceptual thought does not serve as the subject, rather it is mere sound itself that serves as the subject that is the [proponent's] own [intended] locus. The reason for this, if one carries it as far as possible, comes down to whether there is or is not a subject that appears concordantly (chos can mthun snang ba) to both the Buddhist and the Vai ses . ika, for the Buddhist accepts space as being a simple negation (med dgag) consisting in the mere denial of obstruction and contact, whereas the Vai ses . ika accepts that it is a real entity (dngos po) that is independent (rang dbang ba) and is a positive phenomenon (sgrub pa). 20 x8.
[Objection:] Then it would follow that even sound would not appear concordantly to both [parties] , because the Buddhist asserts that sound is derived from the elements ('byung 'gyur; bhautika) x10. Moreover, the omniscient lCang skya [Rol pa'i rdo rje] has said that rGyal tshab rje maintained that the conceptual appearance (rtog pa'i snang ba) was the subject, but that mKhas grub rje did not accept that verbal objects (sgra don; sabd artha) [i.e. conceptual entities] were the subject. 22 And the omniscient 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa has said that taking Primordial Matter as the subject was Dign aga's idea, and that Dharmak ırti's idea was to take the conceptual appearance as the subject. However, suppose we examine their ideas carefully. Then whomsoever's position we might take, be it that of Dign aga and his disciple [Dharmak ırti] What point is there, for those who have such an aim, in deliberations about a thing that has no ability to perform a function? Why should a woman filled with desire wonder whether a eunuch was handsome or not?
x19. [We reply:] There is no necessary implication (ma khyab). This is for the following reasons. The meaning of this quotation is that when someone hopes his desired effect will ensue from some basis, then the basis about which he deliberates must have the ability to perform the function. Thus, [Dharmak ırti] illustrates [his point about the uselessness of deliberation about inefficient things] saying that it is inappropriate, because it would be like, for example, a woman, intent upon sexual pleasure, who took as the subject [of her thought] a eunuch, and after [mistakenly] hearing that he could perform the acts that would give [her pleasure], wondered whether he was handsome or not. Nonetheless, in general, things that are void of ability to perform a function can properly be bases for [positive] proofs and negations. Indeed, the direct basis (dngos rten) for proofs and negations must inevitably be a verbal object. This follows, because:
(a) the reason why the direct basis must be a verbal object when one is denying that sound is permanent or proving that it is impermanent by the reason of its being produced is also grounded in the fact 33 that the conceptual thought that proves or negates relies upon verbal objects; (b) it was said in the Following this explanation, in cases where the basis must be a real entity (dngos po), [such as when one is] proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced or that there is fire on the smoky hill, the direct basis (dngos rten) for these proofs and negations is just the object that is the appearance of sound or hill to conceptual thought as things excluded from what they are not. Sound and hill are not, however, themselves direct bases, because they do not directly appear to the conceptual thought that proves or negates.
As for the meaning of conceptual thought performing the function of negation and proof, it is as follows. When, for example, the quality of the subject (phyogs chos; paks . adharma) is established for proving sound to be impermanent by the reason that it is a product, then from the perspective of the opponent, it is as if sound is initially established and after that producthood newly depends upon sound. There is such an appearance (snang tshul), but in reality (gnas tshod la) there is no such progression.
TIBETAN TEXT OF THE EXCERPT FROM THE GCIG DU BRAL GYI RNAM BZHAG
x1. [453.2; f. 16b] gnyis pa sbyor ngag tu bkod na chos can ma grub pa'i dogs pa ni / dBu ma rgyan gyi tshig zin ltar na / shes pa cha med dang spyi gtso bo sogs kyang rtags sbyor yang dag gi shes 'dod chos can du bkod par mngon pas / de gzhi ma grub pa yin pas rtags de chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs su mi 'gyur ram zhe na / x2. de'i lan la mkhas pa mang pos / rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gnyis char med dgag yin pa bkod na skyon med kyang sgrub pa dang ma yin dgag bkod na ma grub pa'i rtags su 'gyur zhes smras so // de ni rNam bshad dgongs pa rab gsal las / rtags des a smras pa'i chos can bkag kyang skyon med pa ni rtags dang chos gnyis ka rnam bcad tsam b yin pa'i gnad kyis so // c zhes pa lta bu rJe yab sras kyi gsung 'ga' zhig la brten par snang mod / de tsam gyis dogs pa'i mtha' sel mi nus pas 'di ltar bshad dgos te / rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gnyis char ma yin dgag dang sgrub pa gang rung bkod kyang ma grub pa'i rtags su mi 'gyur ba yang yod de / ri bong rwa chos [454; f. 17a] can zla ba zhes pa'i sgras brjod rung yin te / rtog yul na yod pa'i phyir zhes pa'i sbyor ba lta bu'o // 'di 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa'i rdo rje'i dgongs pa'o // yang ri bong rwas phug pa chos can / skyes bu sdug bsngal bar sgrub pa'i rtags ltar snang yin te / skyes bu sdug bsngal bar sgrub pa'i tshul gsum ma yin pa'i gtan tshigs yin pa'i phyir zhes pa'i sbyor ba lta bu ste / 'di Tshad ma rigs rgyan gyi dgongs pa'o // x3. de dag chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs su mi 'gyur ba'i rgyu mtshan de sgrub kyi rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gang rung yin na yod pa yin mi dgos pa'i gnad kyis yin pas / des na rtags chos gnyis kar med dgag bkod na yang de sgrub kyi rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos gang rung yin na yod pas khyab pa can yin na chos can ma grub pa'i skyon du 'gyur ba yang yod de / dper na yongs grub kyi rtags kyis chos kyi bdag med phra mo sgrub pa lta bu'o // de'i phyir gzhi ma grub pa chos can du bkod pa'i tshe rtags su bzung ba de yin na yod pa yin dgos phyin chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshigs ltar snang du 'gyur la / rtags su bzung ba de yin na yod pa yin mi dgos na gtan tshigs ltar snang du mi 'gyur ba'i tshul la zhib cha legs par thon dgos so // a dGongs pa rab gsal: des. bsTan dar: de'i. b bsTan dar omits tsam. c dBu ma dgongs pa rab gsal f. 200a.
x4. spyir sbyor ba'i chos can la rang rten gyi chos can dang chos can 'ba' zhig pa gnyis las / rang rten gyi chos can ni / Grangs can pa'i ngor d byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa lta bu yin te / de'i tshe sgra nyid la mi rtag pa brten [455; f. 17b] par sgrub pa yin pa'i phyir ro // chos can 'ba' zhig pa ni / Bye brag pa'i ngor yon tan gzhan gyi rten mi byed pa'i rtags kyis dngos por gyur pa'i nam mkha' rtag rdzas ma yin par sgrub pa lta bu yin te / de'i tshe dngos por gyur ba'i nam mkha' la rtag rdzas brten par sgrub pa ma yin pas / de 'dra'i nam mkha' de rten gzhi chos can du ma song bar chos can du bkod pa 'ba' zhig pa yin pa'i phyir / chos can 'ba' zhig pa zhes pa'i don yang chos can du smras kyang bsgrub bya'i chos kyi rten du ma song bar chos can yan gar bar song ba'i don yin pas / de'i phyir sbyor ba de sgrub kyi chos can 'ba' zhig pa ste smras pa'i chos can gzhi ma grub kyang rang rten gyi chos can yod pa yin te / de'i tshe dngos gyur gyi nam mkha' 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la dngos gyur gyi nam mkha' ma yin pa las log par snang ba de sgrub kyi rten gzhi'i chos can du song ba yin pa'i phyir / der thal / phyi rgol gyis de 'dra ba'i nam mkha' dang der snang ba gnyis gcig tu 'khrul nas shes 'dod zhugs pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis de ltar yin pa'i phyir / des na sbyor ba de sgrub kyi rang rten gyi chos can gzhi grub cing tshig yin la bkod pa'i chos can 'ba' zhig pa gzhi ma grub pa'i khyad par 'di 'dra shes pa'i ched du / Tshad ma kun btus las / mngon sum don dang rjes dpag dang yid ches grags pas rang rten la'o // e zhes rang gi chos can ma smos par rang gi rten smos pa'i dgos pa / rNam 'grel mngon sum le'u las / kun tu f rgol ba bdag nyid kyi / g zhes sogs kyi tshigs bcad bcu gsum gyis rgyas par [456; f. 18a] 'chad pa yin no // x5. 'o na sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba'ang byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i rang rten gyi chos can yin par thal / 'dod pa'i phyir zer na x6. mi mtshungs te / rtags yang dag yin na shes 'dod chos can gyi steng du 'god tshul dang mthun par grub dgos pas / rtog pa la sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba kun btags yin pas byas pa dang mthun lugs med pa'i phyir / der thal / dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris las / byas pas sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa na / rtog pa la sgra ma yin pa las log par snang ba'i snang ldog h dngos por med pas byas pa'i rtags de la 'grub pa i min j gyi / snang gzhi sgra la grub k dgos te / dngos po l rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos su byed pa'i gnad kyis so // m zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / khyab ste / dngos po rtags dang bsgrub bya'i chos su bkod pa'i rtags sbyor gyi shes 'dod chos can la rtog pa'i snang ba mi 'jog par shin tu gsal zhing / rNam nges dar t . ık las kyang / rtog pa la nam mkha' snang ba sngar gyi rtags de nges pa'i gzhi chos can yin la / rtog pa la sgrar snang ba byas par nges pa'i gzhir mi rung ba'i phyir mi mtshungs so // n zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / x7. mdor na Bye brag pa'i ngor nam mkha' chos can du bkod kyang de chos can du ma song bar de'i snang ba chos can du song zhing / byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i tshe rtog pa la sgrar snang ba chos can du mi 'gro bar sgra nyid rang rten gyi chos can du 'gro ba'i rgyu mtshan mthar gtugs na / Sangs rgyas pa dang Bye brag pa gnyis ka'i ngor chos [457; f. 18b] can mthun snang ba yod med la gtugs pa yin te / Sangs rgyas pas nam mkha' thogs reg bkag tsam gyi med dgag tu 'dod pa gang zhig / Bye brag pas sgrub pa rang dbang ba'i dngos por 'dod pa'i phyir / x8. 'o na sgra yang de gnyis ka'i ngor mthun snang du grub pa med par thal. Sangs rgyas pas sgra 'byung 'gyur du 'dod pa gang zhig / Bye brag pas sgra nam mkha'i yon tan du 'dod pa'i phyir zhe na / x9. shin tu mi mtshungs te / de gnyis ka'i ngor nyan shes kyi gzung byar gyur pa'i don tsam zhig ma 'khrul ba'i tshad mas rnyed don du mthun snang du grub pa yod la / nam mkha' la ming tsam ma gtogs mthun snang du grub pa'i don btags don btsal na mi rnyed pa'i gnad kyis so // x10. gzhan yang lCang skya thams cad mkhyen pas / rGyal tshab rjes rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du bzhed kyang / mKhas grub rjes sgra don chos can du mi bzhed par gsungs la / kun mkhyen 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pas / gtso bo chos can du bzung ba Phyogs glang gi dgongs pa dang / rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du bzung ba Chos grags kyi dgongs pa yin gsungs kyang / dgongs pa zhib tu brtag na Phyogs h dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris f. 10a and other editions in Tillemans (1984) ık chen rigs pa'i rgya mtsho las / de ltar rtog pa'i snang ba thams cad sgra don yin no zhes spyir bstan pas gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa u la gtso bor snang ba'ang sgra don du grub la / de ltar gtso bo'i sgra don gyi gzhi ldog rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba de nyid rtags sbyor de'i chos can yin zhes bya ba'i don no // v zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / x12. de la kho na re / gtso bo'i sgra don chos can / rtags sbyor de'i chos can yin par thal / gtso bo 'dzin pa'i rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba rtags sbyor de'i chos can yin pa'i phyir na / v Vol. tha f. 149a.
x13. ma khyab / x14. khyab par thal / rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba gtso bo'i sgra don yin pa'i phyir na / x15. yang ma khyab / rang ldog dang gzhi ldog gi khyad par yod pa'i phyir te / T . ık chen de nyid las / des na gtso bo ni yod pa ma yin te ma dmigs pa'i phyir zhes pa'i rtags kyi shes 'dod chos can ni / gtso bo dngos po ba yang ma yin la / gtso bo'i sgra don gyi rang ldog kyang ma yin gyi / 'o na ci zhe na / rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba de nyid
Grangs can [459; f. 19b] pa w dag gtso bo khyad par lnga ldan du 'dod la / rang lugs la sgra don du 'dod pas / khyad par lnga ldan gyi gtso bo yin min rtsod pa'i gzhi yin pa'i phyir rtog pa la gtso bor snang ba chos can du gzung bar byas pa yin no // x zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / rang ldog dang gzhi ldog gi khyad par phye ba skabs 'dir shin tu gces so // x16. de yang Grang can pas de lta bu'i rtog pa'i snang ba khas len kyang snang ba de sgra don du khas mi len pa'i gnad la thug pa yang yin te / Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel / yang blun po kha cig gis de lta bu bdag gi sgra don chos can yin no zhes zer ba ni / de lta bu bdag gi sgra don med par khas blangs pa yin pas rang gi mtshang bsgrags pa yin no // y zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / x17. de ltar rtog pa'i snang ba chos can du rigs mod / 'on kyang pha rol po'i 'dod pa 'gog pa na rtog pa'i snang ba tshig zin la chos can du 'god dgos pa yang ma yin no // 'o na ci zhe na / spyi gtso bo dang rtag pa'i dbang phyug dang gang zag rang rkya ba sogs pha rol pos gang khas blangs pa de nyid ji lta ba bzhin chos can du dngos su 'god dgos te / de lta ma yin na gtso bo la sogs pa rang ldog nas mi khegs pa'i skyon yod pa'i phyir te / rNam 'grel thar lam gsal byed las / de dag gi dgongs pa mkhas pa'i dbang po Ka ma la s ı las / gtso bo nyid chos can du bzung nas dgag dgos kyi / de min na rnam 'gyur sna tshogs kyi nyer len yin pa khegs kyang / gtso bo rang ldog nas mi khegs par 'gyur la / rtags tshad mas nges pa'i gzhi ni gtso bor snang ba nyid la bzhed do // z zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / x18. de la gal te rtog pa'i snang ba [460; f. 20a] chos can du 'dzin mi rigs par thal / de don byed nus stong yin pa'i phyir / khyab te / don byed nus pa ma yin na rgol ba rtog ldan gyi dpyad gzhir mi rung bas khyab pa'i phyir / de skad du rNam 'grel las / w rNam 'grel t .ī k chen reads gangs can pa, which is surely wrong.
don byed nus pa ma yin la // don gnyer brtag pas ci zhig bya // ma ning gzugs bzang mi bzang zhes // 'dod ldan aa rnams kyis brtag ci phan // bb zhes gsungs pa'i phyir na / x19. ma khyab ste / lung de'i don ni rang 'dod pa'i 'bras bu gzhi de las 'grub tu re nas dpyod pa'i gzhi la don byed nus pa dgos zhes pa yin pas / de ni dper na 'khrig pa'i bde ba don du gnyer ba'i bud med kyis / ma ning khyad gzhir bzung nas des skyes pa'i bya ba byed par go nas de'i gzugs mdzes mi mdzes la dpyod pa dang 'dra bas mi 'thad ces ston pa yin gyi / spyir dgag sgrub kyi gzhi la don byed nus stong rung bar ma zad / dgag sgrub byed pa'i dngos kyi rten la sgra don nges can du dgos pa'i phyir / der thal / byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra la rtag cc dgag pa dang mi rtag pa sgrub pa'i dngos kyi rten sgra don yin dgos pa'i rgyu mtshan yang / dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa rnams sgra don la brten pa'i rgyu mtshan gyis yin pa'i phyir / gZhan don le'u las / phyi rol rten min sgra don la // brten nas 'dir ni sgrub pa dang // dgag pa thams cad 'dod pa yin // dd zhes gsungs pa'i phyir dang / sgra'i steng du rtag pa dgag pa dang mi rtag pa sgrub ces pa'i don yang rtog pa'i don byed pa yin pas / de'i tshe dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa de dag la sgra dang byas mi rtag sogs rang mtshan pa dngos su mi [461; f. 20b] snang ba'i phyir / de skad du dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris las / Phyogs glang gis gsungs pa'i don rNam 'grel las / dpag bya dpog par byed pa yi ee // don gyi tha snyad gnas pa 'di // shes pa la grub tha dad la // brten nas rnam par brtags pa f f yin // gg aa PV Tib.: 'dod ldan (= kāminyāh . zhes gsungs pa ltar / gzhi dngos po dgos pa byas pas sgra mi rtag pa dang du ba la la hh me yod du sgrub pa la yang / rtog pa la sgra dang la gnyis de gnyis ma yin pa las log par snang ba'i don nyid dgag sgrub kyi dngos rten yin gyi / sgra dang la nyid dngos kyi rten ma yin te / dgag sgrub byed pa'i rtog pa la dngos su mi snang ba'i phyir dang/ ii zhes gsungs pa'i phyir / dgag sgrub rtog pa'i don byed ces pa'i don yang dper na byas pa'i rtags kyis sgra mi rtag par sgrub pa'i phyogs chos grub pa na / phyi rgol de'i rtog ngo na / sgra dang por grub nas de'i rjes su sgra la byas pa gsar du brten pa lta bu'i snang tshul yod cing / gnas tshod la rim pa de 'dra med pa'i don no // S akya mchog ldan's position turns on the Rigs gter ba apoha theory's contrast between theoretical explanation ('chad pa) and pratical application ('jug pa) and especially the contrast between an object of conceptual thought as it really is (song tshod) (i.e. a mental representation) and what we mistakenly assume it to be (rlom tshod). See Tillemans (1995) rtags rigs, p. 57, which speaks of a triple classification of asiddhahetu, those which are due to objective facts (don la ltos pa), due to attitudes (blo la ltos pa) such as doubt, and those which are due to the debaters (rgol ba la ltos pa) having incompatible views on the nature of the subject. The "reason that is unestablished (asiddha) because of the nonexistence of the entity of the subject" (chos can gyi ngo bo med nas ma grub pa'i gtan tshig) is a subdivision of the first category. 8 On these two types of negation, see Kajiyama (1973) p. 167f. and the references in his n. 1. Indian Buddhist logicians had the important insight that proving a mere negation of existence is, in its logical structure, quite different from proving positive qualities, and that in the former case (i.e. simple denial along the lines of "it is not so that S is existent") subject failure is not a problem at all whereas in the latter case it is. Cf. Matilal (1970) . Tibetan explanations of a sray asiddha, such as those found in dBu ma rgyan gyi zin bris and lCang skya grub mtha', generally cite a passage from Kamala s ıla's Madhyamak aloka as being the source for this idea. The quotation in question is found in Madhyamak aloka D. 172a6-b1, P. Lopez (1987) Kobayashi (1989) . The Tibetan dGe lugs pa treatment of the problem has been developed in detail in Lopez (1987) . all at once', which is of the nature of a mere exclusion, i.e. which has the character of a simple prasajyapratis . edha, is not unestablished. This is because inspite of there being no subject that would be a real entity, there is no invalidation of the mere exclusion of the conventionally designated subject". Our thanks to Mr. Ryusei Keira for making us aware of this passage from S akyabuddhi. This position concerning "mere exclusion" was adopted by later Indian writers such as Prajñ akaragupta, Kamala s ıla and by Tibetans such as Tsong kha pa et al., with the further development that it was argued that when a Buddhist logician was proving a mere exclusion, or non-implicative negation (e.g. that such and such a pseudo-entity did not exist), the Buddhist proponent's intended subject, the svadharmin, was just the conceptual image. (In the case of Dharmak ırti and Devendrabuddhi it is not at all clear that this last additional development is also attributable to them. See n. 13.) Ngag dbang bstan shows the rough edges and pitfalls of this Indo-Tibetan attempt to use the distinction between the two types of negation as a watertight way to delineate between harmless subject failures and genuine a sray asiddha. 9 Unidentified in 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa. The example purports to show that the property being predicated of a nonexistent subject (like a rabbit's horn) can be a positive entity (vidhi) or an implicative negation: it need not necessarily be a prasajyapratis . edha if we are to avoid a sray asiddha. The property being proved here, viz. "being fitting (rung ba = yogya) to be designated by the word 'moon' ", is itself a positive entity. Ngag dbang bstan dar, supposedly following 'Jam dbyangs bzhad pa, has hearkened back to the argumentation found in the prat ıtib adh a section in // "An intended word's designatum (abhidheya), which is in keeping with people's wishes, is unrestricted with regard to objects. Therefore, the person [i.e. the user of language], whose speech is unopposed, is an authority here [i.e. with regard to the designatum of the word]". This doctrine of unrestricted yogyat a is being alluded to in the present argument. Thus, a rabbit's horn is indeed fitting to be the designatum (abhidheya) of the word "moon", in that there is no objective or intrinsic nature found in words or objects that would preclude such a use.
188a3-6: gang la dngos po'i chos yod pa'i ngo bor sgrub par mi 'dod kyi don kyang sgro btags pa'i chos rnam par gcad pa sgrub pa tsam zhig brjod par 'dod pa de la ni ma grub pa nyid la sogs pa'i nyes pa brjod pa tha snyad du yang dngos por gyur pa'i chos can mi dgos te / de ni de'i chos ma yin pa'i phyir ro // de la ltos nas kyang de'i chos can nyid du mi 'thad pa'i phyir ro // de ma grub tu zin kyang bsgrub par bya ba med na de mi 'byung ba'i gtan tshigs mngon par 'dod pa'i don grub pa la gegs byed pa med pa'i phyir ro //; translated in
Ngag bdang bstan dar is obviously playing with a frequently found reasoning (prayoga) called grags pa'i rtags ("reason for a conventional concept" [grags pa = prasiddha, prat ıti] ). This reasoning is given in Indian and Tibetan texts to establish the fact that sa sin (ri bong can, "that which has a rabbit", "that which is hare-marked") is fitting to be the designatum of the word candra ("moon"). The trick is to change ri bong can to ri bong rwa ("the rabbit's horn" The formal argument (prayoga) should be regarded as follows: 'Whatever entity is the object of a conceptual cognition, can be designated by an agreed upon word, just like the entity having branches and so forth [can be designated] by the word 'tree'. Now, sa sin is the object of a conceptual cognition' ". (The conclusion is that sa sin can be designated by the agreed upon word candra.) The usual Tibetan formulation of the prayoga is: ri bong can la zla ba zhes pa'i sgras brjod rung ba yin te / rtog yul na yod pa'i phyir / "That which is hare-marked is fitting to be designated by the word 'moon' because it exists as an object of conceptualization"; see Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs p. 46. 10 See Tshad ma rigs rgyan f. 117a. 11 See Lopez (1987) pp. 173-174. Just as it was shown that avoidance of a sray asiddha is possible even where the property is a positive entity, so now Ngag bdang bstan dar shows that the reason and property being non-implicative negations will not guarantee that a sray asiddha is avoided. To say that the rabbit's horn is the subtle selflessness of the elements because it is their consummate nature is a case of a sray asiddha, even though both the reason and the property are simple negations. In short, it is not so that a sray asiddha is avoided if and only if the reason and property are vyavacchedam atra. Ngag dbang bstan dar, to his credit, proposes a stricter criterion than had his Indo-Tibetan predecessors:
a sray asiddha will be avoided if and only if the reason and property do not imply existence. The innovation here is discrete, but it represents a radically different, and even in some ways better, approach: it turns on the sound logical insight that certain properties (like being blue, etc.) imply existence, while others (like "being thought of") do not, and that subject failure will lead to refutation in all and only the former types of cases. 12 The term rang rten chos can is most likely a Tibetan invention, based on Tibetan writers' choice of a rather misleading an . avini scaya III that the directly designated objects of words were always conceptual representations (kalpan a); he then maintained that although pradh ana did not exist as something real and external, its conceptual representation, or in other words, the verbal object ( sabd artha) existed, so that the charge of a sray asiddha did not apply. In later developments, including what we find in the dGe lugs pa positions and clearly in Ngag dbang bstan dar, the Dharmak ırtian general principle of designata being only concepts will be combined with the svadharmin vs. kevaladharmin contrast to explain when a sray asiddha is avoidable and when it is not. Grosso modo, in nonexistence proofs the svadharmin is the concept and no more; the kevaladharmin is the pseudo-entity. Ngag bdang bstan dar here (following Tsong kha pa and others) applies this point of view to PV IV.141-142's discussion where the Buddhist refutes the Vai ses . ika's version of space. Thus the Vai ses . ika's space becomes the kevaladharmin, whereas the conceptual representation of space is the svadharmin, i.e. the subject accepted by the Buddhist himself. Although the kevaladharmin is obviously refuted, the svadharmin is not and hence a sray asiddha is avoided. However, this synthesis is arguably a later invention. Tillemans is of the opinion that while for a writer like Kamala s ıla (who figures so prominently in the Tibetan theories) this move to combine the notions of svadharmin and conceptual subjects is present in his Madhyamak aloka, in the case of Dharmak ırti this combination is not very likely. The k arik as in PV IV (viz. k. 141-142) that are often interpreted as supporting this combination are probably better interpreted differently. First of all, Prajñ akaragupta's
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an . av arttikabh as . ya (PVBh) ad PV IV. 141-2 clearly specified two interpretations of the k arik as at stake. One advocates proving nonexistence with regard to a subject that is "completely derived from conceptual thought" (vikalpaparinis . t . hite dharmin . i) and thus that the conceptual subject is the svadharmin. The other paraphrases the controversial reasoning about space in such a way that the svadharmin becomes a real entity acceptable to the Buddhist, namely the impermanent space that Buddhists themselves accept. See PVBh 550.18: tath apy anityam ak a sam . dharm ı bhavis . yati. Secondly, this latter interpretaion in PVBh fits noticeably better into the rest of the argumentation in PV IV, k. 136-148, where a completely parallel reasoning against the S am . khya sukh adi ("pleasure, etc." = the three gun . as) is introduced by tathaiva ("in precisely this way") in k. 144-145. This time the svadharmin is clearly taken by Dharmak ırti as not being the conceptual representation of sukh adi, but as being the ordinary, impermanent sensations of pleasure that the Buddhist himself acknowledges. The impression is that reading an advocacy of the combination of svadharmin with conceptual subjects into Dharmak ırti is a later position that may well change Dharmak ırti's own stance. The svadharmin may well have been no more than an entity acceptable as real (and not conceptual) to the Buddhist himself. And determining what this actual subject was seems to have involved paraphrasing of the explicitly stated arguments, but had little to do with postulating conceptual subjects. 14 Ngag dbang bstan dar is (correctly) simplifying the argument. As it stands in Dharmak ırti, the reasoning at stake seeks to prove that space does not have "a novel nature unproduced by other conditions", in other words, a permanent but real intrinsic nature. Cf. 
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The argument presupposes some fundamental positions in the dGe lugs pa understanding of apoha. In brief, the dGe lugs pa explain the conceptual representation of real space (dngos gyur gyi nam mkha' = vastubh ut ak a sa) as being "what appears as excluded from the contrary of real space" (dngos gyur gyi nam mkha' ma yin pa las log par snang ba). They then add the additional step that not only does the conceptual appearance/representation (snang ba) itself appear in this way but real space itself (albeit nonexistent) also appears (snang) as excluded from the contrary of real space. The result is that the dGe lugs can argue that the svadharmin, the actual dharmin that is being argued about, i.e. the conceptual representation, appears concordantly (mthun snang) to both parties in the debate. However, the Vai ses . ika, who believes in vastubh ut ak a sa, does not know that it is only a mentally invented concept being argued about rather than vastubh ut ak a sa itself. The opponent thus has the impression that he is arguing about actual space, while the Buddhist proponent knows that they are both only arguing about the concept. This is said to be possible because both real space itself and the representation/appearance (snang ba) appear erroneously mixed together ('dres nas) to conceptual thought. An analysis of this type of argumentation is to be found in Tillemans (1995) ; see Lopez (1987) pp. 178-179 for rGyal tshab's use of the same type of argument; see Klein (1991) pp. 35-36 on lCang skya's and bsTan dar's position that "the actual object appears, mixed with its image, to thought"; see also Yoshimizu (1997 Yoshimizu ( ) pp. 1107 Yoshimizu ( -1108 Dreyfus (1992) p. 36 et sq. Tillemans stresses that the position that X itself appears (snang ba) to the conceptual thought about X is by and large a dGe lugs pa-gSang phu ba development, with problematic or no antecedents at all in India. It seems to be equally rejected by Sa skya pas like S akya mchog ldan; see op. cit. p. 872 et sq. In part, the position was facilitated by the syntactical ambiguities in the Tibetan term snang ba, which can mean "appears", "what appears" and "appearance". 16 an . a to exist relative to the faultless subject of enquiry in accordance with the mode of presentation". The 'god tshul "mode of presentation" in Ngag dbang bstan dar (as in Yongs 'dzin rtags rigs) refers to the type of verb stated in the reason, i.e. the copula yin as in e.g. byas pa yin pa'i phyir or byas pa'i phyir "because : : : is a product" or the existential yod as in du ba yod pa'i phyir "because there is smoke" -we thus have the possibility of yin 'god or yod 'god. The point of including 'god tshul dang mthun par in the definition of the paks . adharma(tva) is a rather cumbersome way to guarantee that the subject possesses the property of the reason in the very same way as the proponent has stated, i.e. yin or yod. 19 Ngag dbang bstan dar's reply here and in what follows turns on the principle that the reason must be a property of the subject, i.e. of the svadharmin: in other words, the reason must be a paks . adharma (see n. 18). Now, when we prove that space is not a permanent substance, the conceptual representation of space is indeed not a substance, and will also be qualified by the reason. Thus the paks . adharmatva will hold. On the other hand, if we are validly proving that sound is impermanent because it is produced, then sound itself (and not the concept of sound) must be the svadharmin. This is because sound is both impermanent and something causally produced -hence the paks . adharmatva holds with regard to that subject, i.e. sound qua particular, rather than the concept of sound. See Lopez (1987) pp. 175-176. 20 On the Tibetan development of the problem of chos can mthun snang ba ("concordantly appearing subjects") see D. Lopez (1987), p. 78 et passim; Hopkins (1989); Yotsuya (1995) ; Tillemans (1990), p. 42f.; Tillemans and Tomabechi (1995) Poussin, Bibliotheca Buddhica, reprint Osnabr uck, 1970) , where Realist and S unyav adin conceptions are argued to be radically incommensurable so that there are no commonly acknowledged (ubhayaprasiddha) subjects when the two parties are debating about ultimate truth -see Tillemans (1992) n. 5 for a translation of the passage from Prasannapad a. The issue is also taken up by non-dGe lugs pa writers (such as Go rams pa bSod nams seng ge in his lTa ba'i ngan sel f. 41af.), but plays a particularly important, and undeniably complex, role in the dGe lugs pa Sv atantrika Madhyamaka system.
Ngag bdang bstan dar is presupposing an understanding of Tsong kha pa's position on Sv atantrika. The point in the argument is delicate. Judging by the previous discussion, bsTan dar seems to accept that the svadharmin in the BuddhistVai ses . ika arguments, viz. the concept of space, is what both parties are actually arguing about -nonetheless this conceptual svadharmin, as he had said earlier, could not be explicitly acknowledged by the Vai ses . ika opponent, who thinks he is arguing about real space (vastubh ut ak a sa). bsTan dar then argus that space itself is incommensurable for both parties, i.e. given the parties' differing respective views on what space is, a concordantly appearing and commonly acknowledged (ubhayaprasiddha) space cannot be what they are arguing about: space is thus the kevaladharmin and cannot be the svadharmin. (Here one could reasonably ask if the svadharmin, i.e. the concept, appears concordantly to both, given their respective positions.) In what follows, Ngag dbang bstan dar alludes to an objection in Prasannapad a that if the Realist and S unyav adin have no commonly recognized subject, then nor do Buddhists and Vai ses . ikas when they argue about sound being impermanent or not, given that both have different conceptions of what sound is; see Prasannapad a p. 29. The dGe lugs pa reply, based on Candrak ırti, is that sound, irrespective of one's philosophical theories, is heard commonly by both parties, whereas space is just a purely theoretical notion without any perceptual content in common for both parties.
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Ngag bstan dar is arguing from a Sv atantrika position where concordantly appearing subjects and especially non-erroneous valid cognitions must be possible for both parties, as this is a condition for the logical reasons being "autonomous" (rang rgyud = svatantra). The phrase ma 'khrul ba'i tshad ma'i rnyed don du mthun snang du grub pa ("established as appearing concordantly as an object found by non-erroneous means of valid cognition") alludes to the dGe lugs pa view that for a Sv atantrika, who holds a type of limited realism, a pram an . a is non-erroneous in apprehending its objects as being established by their own intrinsic natures (rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa). Note that for a P asa _ ngika, by contrast, a pram an . a can supposedly never be correct in this way, because these intrinsic natures do not exist at all, and thus for him all pram an . as without exception would be erroneous. The incommensurability between Realist and S unyav adin then lies in the fact that the way the subject is established by a pram an . a (tshad mas grub tshul) will differ for the two parties, the realist taking the pram an . a as non-erroneous and the S unyav adin holding it to be erroneous. [subjects] appear to both the proponent and the opponent, so too, since form and so forth also appear to everyone from cowherds' wives on up, how is it that they would be unestablished (asiddha)?" 25 See n. 24. 26 bsTan dar has truncated the passage from the Svavr . tti. The additions to our translation follow the missing portions of the Skt. and Tib. of the Svavr . tti. Note that it is clear from the Skt. that Ngag dbang bstan dar is wrong in reading spyi gtso bo'i sgra, and that the reading ci (= kim) gtso bo'i sgra in the bsTan 'gyur is the correct one. Ngag dbang bstan dar seems to be have been seduced by the homonymity of spyi and ci, plus the fact that pradh ana is usually rendered as spyi gtso bo by indigenous Tibetan authors of the dGe lugs school. Our translation of the quotation follows the Svavr . tti's Sanskrit and the Tibetan in the bsTan 'gyur, which must yield a different understanding from that of Ngag dbang bstan dar himself. Unfortunately, it is difficult to guess how the latter would have understood the passage. But a natural reading of bsTan dar's version of the Svavr . tti passage would be something like: "Thus, in dependence upon this subject, this object that appears due to the word pradh ana Tillemans (1993) pp. 69-70, n. 6 for explanations and references to Pram an . av arttika I. The fundamental idea is that the object directly designated by a word for X is a conceptual construction proceeding by exclusion of all which is non-X. As for rang ldog and gzhi ldog, these are terms whose Indian origins, if indeed they have any, seem quite obscure. The terms figure preeminently in the bsDus grwa literature (and hence in dGe lugs pa pram an . a commentaries) as part of a scholastic category of different sub-types of the Indian logician's notion of vy avr . tti, including also don ldog ("exclusion qua object") and spyi ldog ("exclusion qua universal"). Given their place in a literature heavily influenced by the Tshad ma bsdus pa texts of gSang phu traditions, it is not unlikely that the interpretation of these four sub-varieties of vy avr . tti, and possibly even their origin, is due to the gSang phu traditions stemming from Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge. See e.g. the third chapter of Yongs 'dzin bsdus grwa chung, the chapter concerning ldog pa ngos 'dzin "recognizing exclusions" (in Textbooks of Se-ra Monastery for the Primary Course of Studies ed. T. Kelzang and S. Onoda, Kyoto, 1985) . The argumentation in Ngag dbang bstan dar turns essentially on the distinction between knowing an object X as being simply an X itself (rang), and knowing an instance, or basis (gzhi), of X but under some other name or description -the first case is that of rang ldog and the second gzhi ldog. Thus, for example, the rang ldog pertaining to a vase (bum pa'i rang ldog), is just the vase and not, e.g., some particular bulbous golden object that is able to carry water -the latter would be a gzhi ldog of vase. In the context at hand, a Buddhist and a S am . khya, when arguing about Primordial Matter, are both arguing about a mere concept of Primordial Matter, i.e. a verbal object (sgra don). Nonetheless they cannot be arguing about the rang ldog of the verbal object (sgra don gyi rang ldog) of Primordial Matter because this would mean that both know the verbal object to be just a verbal object, i.e. a conceptually and verbally created fiction; clearly, the S am . khya does not know this, but thinks that Primordial Matter is more than just a verbal object, because it is for him fully real. Thus they are both thinking and arguing about a type of verbal object, but one that both parties don't consciously recognize as such -hence the insistence on the subject of their deliberations being the gzhi ldog of a verbal object. See also n. 15 on the dGe lugs pa idea of an object (like Primordial Matter, etc.) and its conceptual representation appearing "mixed" ('dres nas snang ba) and hence indistinguishable to the opponent. 31 Literally, "from their exclusions qua the things themselves". On rang ldog, see n. 30 On the argument at stake, see n. 32. 32 The point is that if we explicitly presented the subject as being something along the lines of the concept of Primordial Matter, and not Primordial Matter itself, we would not actually succeed in refuting Primordial Matter. The argument would not tell against the S am . khya opponent, who is convinced that there really is such an entity and that it is a fortiori not a mere concept. On the other hand, when we establish by means of a pram an . a that the reason is a property of the subject (paks . adharma), then the subject can only be the conceptual construct, i.e. only the appearance as Primordial Matter (gtso bor snang ba nyid). The argument at stake is, in fact, that both the kevaladharmin and svadharmin have their purpose: the former assures that the refutation presents the subject as the opponent conceives it, while the latter is the proponent's actual subject that will serve as the basis upon which will be assessed the three characteristics of the logical reason. Finally, note that we cannot say with any certainty which exact passages from the Madhyamak aloka rGyal tshab rje had in mind. Go ram pa bSod nams seng ge. lTa ba ngan sel = dBu ma la 'jug pa'i dkyus kyi sa bcad pa dang gzhung so so'i dka' ba'i gnas la dpyad pa lta ba ngan sel. In Sa skya pa'i bka ' 'bum, vol. 13, Tokyo, 1969. gSer mdog Pan . chen S akya mchog ldan. 
